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Local Environmental Control and Institutional
Crowding-Out
JUAN CAMILO CARDENAS
Universidad Javeriana, Bogota, Colombia
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and
CLEVE WILLIS *
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Summary. Ð Regulations that are designed to improve social welfare typically begin with the
premise that individuals are purely self-interested. Experimental evidence shows, however, that
individuals do not typically behave this way; instead, they tend to strike a balance between self and
group interests. From experiments performed in rural Colombia, we found that a regulatory
solution for an environmental dilemma that standard theory predicts would improve social welfare
clearly did not. This occurred because individuals confronted with the regulation began to exhibit
less other-regarding behavior and made choices that were more self-interested; that is, the
regulation appeared to crowd out other-regarding behavior. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All
rights reserved.
Key words Ð institutional crowding-out, external regulation, local environmental quality,
experiments, South America, Colombia

1. INTRODUCTION
Economic institutions are designed to alter
behavior, to stimulate actions intended to
produce outcomes that are socially superior to
those expected to ¯ow from self-regarding individual choices. A small empirical literature
suggests, however, that institutions designed to
induce Pareto-superior outcomes may aect
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individual choices in surprising and contrary
ways. In this paper we present results from a
series of experiments designed to study the effects of external regulatory control of local
environmental quality. We ®nd that subjects
made themselves worse-o when they faced a
modestly enforced government-imposed regulation that standard theory would predict
to be welfare-improving. The reason for this
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mystifying result appears to be that when subjects were confronted with a regulatory constraint on their behavior, they tended, on
average, toward purely self-interested behavior
(that is, toward pure Nash strategies), while in
the absence of regulatory control their choices
were signi®cantly more group-oriented.
We are by no means the ®rst to suggest that
institutions designed and expected to do good
might actually engender contrary behavior. A
number of authors have suggested that paying
a monetary reward to motivate socially desirable behavior may actually do the opposite
because it may crowd out an individualÕs sense
of public-spiritedness. Titmus (1971) suggested
that individuals donate blood more willingly
when they do so purely voluntarily than when
they are oered money for their donations. 1 In
the environmental arena, Frey and OberholzerGee (1997) found that Swiss residents were
willing to accept nuclear waste disposal in their
community purely out of a sense of public
spiritedness about twice as frequently as when
they were oered compensation for accepting
the negative externality. Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) found a similar phenomenon in
Nevada; raising tax rebates failed to engender
support for siting a nuclear waste facility at
Yucca Mountain near Las Vegas.
Evidence that regulatory institutions may
crowd out public motivations in favor of
greater self-interest is not limited to the eects
of monetary incentives. Ostman (1998) suggests
that external control of common pool resources
may have a negative eect by shifting responsibility to the regulatory agency and essentially
absolving individuals from other-regarding
moral obligations. Frolich and Oppenheimer
(1998) designed a series of experiments to operationalize RawlsÕ (1971) ``veil of ignorance''
in the context of private contributions to a pure
public good. In addition to a standard contribution game, subjects played a game in which
their payos resulted from a random reassignment of individual payos. This veil over the
link between individual choices and payos
forced subjects to consider the consequences of
their choices on the payos of the rest of their
group. Indeed, the game was designed so that
randomizing the assignment of payos generated a dominant strategy to contribute the ef®cient amount to the public good. As predicted,
subjects did contribute signi®cantly more to the
public good than under the standard treatment.
More important, however, they also found
strong evidence that the institution of random

payos shifted individual motivations toward
greater self-interest despite the fact that the
institution was designed to force a stronger
group-orientation. Put simply, the institution
served its intended purpose, but it seemed to
crowd out other-regarding preferences. 2
We are interested in examining the eects of
external institutions (rules and regulations imposed from outside a community) on behavior
in an experimental setting, in particular the
eects of external control of environmental
quality in rural settings of the developing
world. Our design has a number of features,
which combine to make it rather unique. (The
details of our experimental design are provided
in Section 2.) First, rather than conducting
experiments in a laboratory setting, our experiments are conducted in three rural villages of
Colombia, South America. Second, we consciously designed our experiments to approximate an environmental quality problem that
rural villagers in developing countries are likely
to face. Speci®cally, subjects were asked to decide how much time they would spend collecting ®rewood from a surrounding forest, while
realizing that this activity has an adverse eect
on local water quality because of soil erosion.
Third, we confront a subset of subjects with a
government-imposed quota on the amount of
time that can be spent collecting ®rewood. The
quota is only modestly enforced, which is typical of command-and-control environmental
policies that rural villagers in the developing
world actually face. Despite the weak enforcement of the quota, standard economic theory
predicts that the external control will produce
more ecient choices.
We consider two treatments to examine
whether external control of local environmental
quality may crowd out group-oriented behavior. Each group of subjects plays a number of
initial rounds of the game without regulation
and without being able to communicate with
each other. A subset of groups go on to play
additional rounds in which they are confronted
with the government-imposed regulation. The
other groups also play additional rounds, but
instead of facing an external regulation, individuals are allowed to communicate with others
in their group between rounds.
Allowing some groups to communicate was
motivated by the fact that local cooperative
eorts are frequently the alternative to external
regulation in developing countries. Moreover,
by the fact that relatively more is known about
the role of face-to-face communication in

enhancing levels of cooperation in experiments
of this general type. Much of the literature on
this subject is summarized by Ostrom, Gardner
and Walker (1994), and Ledyard (1995). In
brief, the ®ndings show that communication
enhances the likelihood of individuals shifting
from relatively self-interested decisions to more
group-oriented ones.
In Section 3 we report our results. Consistent
with ®ndings of the experimental literature on
contributions to public goods and exploitation
of common properties (Ledyard, 1995; Ostrom,
1998), we ®nd that when subjects do not face
external restrictions and cannot communicate
with each other, their decisions tend to be neither pure Nash strategies nor ecient choices,
but somewhere between these extremes. Absent
regulation, the simple ability to communicate
allows individuals to make more ecient
choices. But, our results about the eects of
external regulation are newÐsurprisingly, regulatory control caused subjects to tend, on average, to make choices that were closer to their
pure Nash strategies. Consequently, average
individual payos were lower than in the absence of regulation, and much lower than the
payos of those subjects who were simply allowed to communicate with each other, in spite
of the fact that the regulatory institution was
designed to induce more ecient choices.
Institutional crowding-out suggests that wellintentioned but modestly enforced government
controls of local environmental quality and
natural resource use may perform rather
poorly, especially as compared to informal local management. In Section 4 we discuss this
and other implications of the crowding-out
eect, as well as suggest ways in which this line
of research should be extended.
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
As noted in the introduction, we designed
our experiments to confront our subjects with a
social dilemma concerning environmental
quality, the structure of which would closely
mimic their actual experiences. Toward that
end, our ®eld experiments were undertaken
during the summer of 1998 in three areas in
Colombia. The speci®c locations were chosen
because they each have predominantly rural
populations with signi®cant interests in local
natural resources and environmental quality. In
addition, payos for the game were generated
from a model of individual eorts to collect

®rewood from local forests. Private and social
interests diverge in the model because we assumed that higher levels of ®rewood extraction
would heighten soil erosion and ultimately
damage local water quality. We consciously
framed our experiment so that the subjects were
fully aware that they were playing a game with
this speci®c relationship between ®rewood extraction and water quality in place.
(a) The subjects
In the Colombian village of Encino, located
in the eastern Andean region, residents enter
local tropical cloud forests to extract ®rewood, log timber on a small scale, and to
hunt. Like all of the sites we visited, water for
consumption and irrigation comes nearly untreated from local rivers. Of the three areas
that we visited, the relationship between forest
cover and water quality is most critical in
Encino, and the residents of this village are
acutely aware of the problem. Water quality
degradation caused by forest cover losses is
less severe in the villages of Circasia and
Filandia in the Quindio coee region in the
mid-Andes; it is nevertheless a signi®cant
problem. In Quindio, subjects for our experiments were drawn speci®cally from a group of
families whose livelihood is related to the
extraction and processing of natural ®bers
from local forests. As in Encino, water is
drawn from local rivers and residents are
aware that extracting forest products can lead
to lower water quality. In Nuqui, located on
the Paci®c coast, villagers harvest coastal
mangroves for ®rewood and other wood
products, but their water comes from further
inland; hence, they do not experience a direct
link between their exploitation of local
sources of wood and water quality. They face
a similar dilemma, however, because their
exploitation of the mangroves for wood adversely aects coastal ®sh populations upon
which they also depend.
To sum up, the population from which the
subjects for these experiments were drawn
consists of rural households that live in areas
that depend heavily on local forests for wood
products. In each location, exploitation of local
forests aects another aspect of their livelihoods adversely: water quality in Encino and
Quindio, and ®sh populations in Nuqui. Hence,
the subjects face social dilemmas in their daily
lives that are similar to the one we confront
them with in the experiments. In each of the

three settings, the participants generally knew
each other well, having lived in the same village
for most of their lives. Schooling, age and income levels varied signi®cantly for the participants within each group. Most participants had
fewer than six years of schooling, roughly half
were between 30 and 50 years old, and all were
16 or older.
(b) Payos
The payos for our experiments were generated by a simple model of a ®xed number of
homogeneous individuals that exploit a local
forest for ®rewood. In each round of the games,
each individual is given an endowment of time e
that can be allocated to collecting ®rewood or
to providing labor to an unrelated market. Let
xi denote the amount of time individual i
spends collecting ®rewood from the common,
and let w denote the prevailing wage for labor.
Then, i's decision to provide e ÿ xi  units of
labor to the formal sector yields a payo of
w  e ÿ xi . Time spent collecting ®rewood
from the forest yields a private bene®t, which
we assume takes the quadratic form g xi  
cxi ÿ / xi 2 =2, where c and / are strictly positive and are chosen in part to guarantee
g xi  > 0, for xi 2 1; e. The strict concavity of
g xi  indicates diminishing marginal private
returns to time spent collecting ®rewood.
Subjects were told explicitly that their decision to spend time extracting ®rewood would
aect water quality in the area adversely. We
assumed that water quality q is a quadratic
function of the aggregate amount of time individuals in the community
spend collecting
P
P 2
®rewood; speci®cally, q
xj   q0 ÿ b
xj  =
0
2, where b > 0, and q is interpreted to be water
quality in the absence of ®rewood extraction.
Again these P
parameters are chosen in part
P to
guarantee q
xj  > 0 for all feasible
xj .
AnPindividualÕs
P valuation of water quality is
f
xj   aq
xj , where a is another positive
constant.
P
De®ne u xi ; xj  to be the sum of the
sources of utility for an individual exploiter of
the local forest. Parameters P
were chosen, in
part, to guarantee
that
u
x
;
xj  > 0 for all
i
P
possible xi and
xj . To facilitate scaling individual payos, we take an individualÕs payo
function to be a positive, monotonic transformation F of u. In particular, F u  lg =d ug ,
where l, d, and g are all positive constants. An
individualÕs payo function is then

 X 
U xi ;
xi
h X 
ig
 lg =d f
xj  g xi   w e ÿ xi 
 
X   
2
 lg =d a q0 ÿ b
xj
2
g
1
 cxi ÿ / xi 2 =2  w e ÿ xi  :
Each group consisted of n  8 subjects, and
each subject was allocated e  8 units of time in
each round. Pre-testing of the experimental
designs at the Humboldt Institute for Biodiversity in Villa de Leyva, Colombia, led us to
denominate units of time as months per year.
Scale concerns led us to choose the following
remaining parameter values: w  30; c  97.2;
/  3.2; q0  1372.8; b  1; a  1; l  2;
d  16,810 and g  2. Individual payos were
therefore calculated from the payo function
 X 
xi
U xi ;

 X 2 
 4=16; 810 1372:8 ÿ
xj
2  97:2xi
2
ÿ 3:2 xi 2 =2  30 8 ÿ xi  :

2

Subjects were given a table of payos (Figure 1,
excluding the highlighting of some of the cells)
as a function of individual choices and the
choices of all other participants.
(c) Nash strategies and the balance between
self-interested and other-regarding behavior
Because extracting ®rewood generates a pure
public bad in the form of lower water quality,
standard theory predicts that purely self-interested individuals will spend more time harvesting ®rewood than is socially optimal.
Indeed, one common reference point for experiments of this type is the one-shot, completeinformation Nash equilibrium (the standard
model of purely self-interested strategic behavior) and another is the outcome at which
group welfare is maximized. Although we do
not ignore these benchmarks, we believe that
for an investigation of whether external controls
on individual behavior crowd out group-oriented
behavior, a more appropriate benchmark are the
individualsÕ pure Nash strategiesÐthat is, individual payo-maximizing choices taking the
choices of the rest of the group as ®xed. In fact,
we take the dierence between an individualÕs

Nash best-response to the choices of the other
players in the group and his or her actual
choice to be an indicator of how that individual
balances self-interests and those of the entire
group.
To illustrate the point, suppose there are
eight players and each of seven players chooses
to spend two months collecting ®rewood from
the surrounding forest. Since the sum of the
seven playersÕ choices is 14 months, Figure 1
indicates that the eighth playerÕs payo-maximizing responseÐthe individualÕs Nash bestresponseÐis to spend eight months collecting
®rewood. (We have highlighted the cells in
Figure 1 that indicate an individualÕs pure Nash
strategy, although these cells were not highlighted for the participants.) This choice is
made purely out of self-interest, without regard
for the welfare of the others in the group. Note
that player eightÕs payo in this outcome is 776
points, while each of the other seven receive 535
points (for each of them, the sum of the othersÕ
choices is 20 months, while they choose two
months).
Now imagine that the eighth player chooses
three months instead of eight, while the other
seven players continue to choose two months.
We consider this to be a signi®cantly more
group-oriented choiceÐit is costly because that
playerÕs payo is now 652 points instead of 776:
however, each of the other playersÕ payos increase from 535 points to 606 (for each of them,
the sum of the othersÕ choices is now 15
months, while they choose two months). Much
of our analysis in Section 4 is based upon the
dierences between the playersÕ actual choices
and their Nash best-responses: choices that are
close to Nash responses indicate relatively selfinterested behavior, while those that are further
away indicate stronger other-regarding behavior.
As for the standard benchmarks, it is
straightforward to show that in our design the
optimal amount of time each individual should
spend collecting ®rewood is one month. 3 On
the other hand, since a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium requires that every playerÕs choice
be a best-response to every other playerÕs bestresponse, in this context the Nash equilibrium
is reached if every individual decides to spend
six months collecting ®rewood from the nearby
forest. It is worth noting that at the Nash
equilibrium, subjects earn only about 24% of
the payos attainable in the ecient outcome.
As noted in the introduction, we confront a
subset of groups of subjects with a quota on the

amount of time that can legally be spent collecting ®rewood and an inspection/penalty
protocol to enforce compliance to the quota.
The eect of this regulation on the relative
balance of self-interested and other-regarding
behavior is the primary focus of this work.
Suppose that the quota is s. An audit of an
individualÕs activities occurs with probability p.
An individual found to have spent xi > s time
collecting ®rewood in a particular period faces
a penalty p on every unit of time in excess of s.
Thus, a participant faces an expected penalty of
pp(xi ) s). Assuming risk-neutrality, the Nash
strategy for an P
individual in this treatment
maximizes U xi ; xi  ÿ pp xi ÿ s. Since the
expected penalty is an additional cost of collecting ®rewood, individuals should choose to
spend less time collecting ®rewood than they
would in the absence of any regulation.
Under the regulation-with-enforcement treatment, we chose the individual quota s to be
the ecient choice; that is, s  1. We chose the
probability of an audit to be p  1/16, and the
unit penalty for exceeding s  1 to be p  100;
therefore, the subjects faced an expected marginal penalty for violating the standard of
pp  100/16  6.25. This enforcement regime is
rather weak in the sense that the expected
marginal penalty is not sucient to induce riskneutral players to comply with the quota. We
chose a relatively weak enforcement protocol
because we believe that weak enforcement best
characterizes the state-imposed regulations our
subjects actually encounter. In rural communities of developing countries like those where
our experiments were conducted, monitoring
and enforcement of state and federal regulations is likely to be quite lax because of high
monitoring costs and limited budgets. 4
Assuming risk neutrality, we have calculated
the expected individual payos under our regulation-with-enforcement treatment, in which
expected penalties are subtracted from gains,
and show them in Figure 2. 5 (Subjects were
not given this table.) Again, the highlighted
cells indicate Nash responses to the choices of
all the other players: these responses form the
benchmark that indicates the balance between
self-interested and other-regarding behavior
when the subjects face the regulatory control.
As expected, for most aggregate choices of time
spent in the forest by others, the Nash bestresponse is lower than in the absence of regulation. In fact, the Nash equilibrium is reached
when each player chooses to spend ®ve units of
time harvesting ®rewood as opposed to six

Figure 1. Individual payos and Nash responses.

Figure 2. Expected payos and Nash responses under regulation.

units in the Nash equilibrium absent the regulatory control. It is worth noting that at the
regulatory Nash equilibrium with risk-neutral
subjects, an individualÕs expected payo is 268
points. Because the enforcement protocol is too
weak to induce perfect compliance to the quota, this value is about 42% of individual payos
obtainable in the ecient outcome. But, since
the regulation is intended to induce more ecient choices, each individualÕs expected payo
is about 73% higher than the Nash equilibrium
payos in the absence of regulation.
(d) The experiments
Each session of the experiment involved eight
subjects and two monitors. The subjects sat at
individual desks that were distributed in a circle
with enough separation between the desks so
they could not look at anotherÕs work. Except
in periods when communication was allowed,
the desks faced away from the center of the
circle. In each round, each subject would
choose how many units of time, xi 2 0; 8, to
spend collecting ®rewood from a local forest.
Subjects were given the payos table (Figure 1
without the shading) and they knew that the
other participants consulted the same table.
Thus, although individuals could not know in
advance what the others would choose, they
knew that their decisions were based on the
same payos. Once a subject made a decision
for a particular round, this decision was written
on a slip of paper. When all subjects had made
their decisions, a monitor collected each slip of
paper and gave them to another monitor who
recorded the individual decisions and calculated the total for the group. This total was announced to the subjects, who then determined
their own payos from the payos table. Subjects kept a record of their own payos as a
check on the monitorÕs record.
Each session began with some welcoming
remarks within which the subjects were told
that the session would last approximately two
hours. A monitor would then read the instructions to the participants. (The instructions
are available from the authors.) Results from
pre-tests of the experiment led us to decide not
to give the subjects written instructions because
of the wide variation in levels of literacy among
the subjects. The instructions explained the
basic setting of the game, how points were
earned, how these points were converted to
cash at the end of the session, and the procedures of the game. The instructions included

three dierent examples to familiarize the subjects with the payos and the procedures. Two
practice rounds were conducted. The monitor
asked for questions at several points, and when
there were no further questions the game began
with round one. Large, readable posters of the
payo table, the forms the subjects used during
the game, and the examples from the instructions were placed on one wall of the ``®eld lab.''
In total, 14 groups from three villages played
two treatments of the game. Each of the 14
groups played 8±11 initial rounds of the game.
During these initial rounds individuals made
their choices without communicating with the
others in their session or with the monitors. The
subjects did not know how many rounds would
be played. After the initial rounds the monitors
would stop the game and announce a new set of
rules for the forthcoming rounds. At the beginning of the session, the subjects were not
told that the rules would change at some point
in the session.
(i) Communication treatment
After the initial rounds, nine groups were
told that they could now communicate with
each other between rounds for three minutes.
Between rounds the subjects turned their desks
toward each other. They could talk to each
other about anything, but they could not
threaten others or agree to transfers of cash at
the end of the game. Once three minutes had
passed, the subjects were required to turn their
desks back around and make their individual
choices in private. These groups played additional 9±12 rounds in this way.
(ii) Regulation treatment
The other ®ve groups were not allowed to
communicate after the initial rounds. Instead
they faced a regulation that stipulated they
should spend no more that one unit of time
collecting ®rewood from the forest in each
round. They were told that after all had made
their choices in a round, there was a one chance
in two that one of them would be selected for
an audit to verify compliance with the rule.
After all had submitted their choices for the
round and the aggregate amount of time spent
in the common was announced, a die was rolled
to determine whether an inspection would occur that period. An inspection would take place
only if an even number came up. To determine
which individual would be inspected if an even
number was rolled, a number between one and
eight would be drawn from a hat and that

personÕs choice would be audited. Thus the
probability that any one player would be audited for a particular round was 1/16. Once a
player was chosen to be audited, a monitor
would walk to that personÕs desk and check for
compliance. If the audited player was found to
be in violation for that round, a penalty of 100
points per unit of time above the time quota
would be subtracted from that playerÕs payo
for that round. Although the other players
knew that an audit had been conducted and
who had been audited, they did not know
whether a penalty was assessed, nor the extent
of the penalty. These groups played an additional 9±12 rounds under these rules.
At the end of each session, total points for
each individual were calculated. Subjects were
paid that number in pesos for their participation. For the villages in which the experiments
were conducted, a daily minimum wage centered around 7,000 pesos (about US $5.40 at
the time). Including practice rounds, most
participants engaged in 20 rounds of decisions.
If all subjects made the ecient choice in each
round, they would have each earned about
12,900 pesos (approximately $11.73 US) in the
experiment. Average earning for the experiments was 7,884 pesos.
3. RESULTS
We begin the analysis of the experimental
data by considering average choices. Figure 3
and the third column of Table 1 summarize the
average decisions made by 112 participants
formed into 14 groups of eight villagers each.
Nine of these groups (denoted COM) would
ultimately be allowed to communicate between
rounds after 8±11 rounds of not being able to
communicate. The other ®ve groups (denoted
REG) would be subject to the imperfectly enforced time quota, x  1, after 8±11 rounds of
no communication. As indicated earlier, we
ended the ®rst and second stages at dierent
points to be sure that terminal rounds could
not be anticipated. For the ®rst stage, we
therefore consider only the ®rst eight rounds of
®rst-stage decisions for each group. All groups
played nine rounds in the second stage, and
some a few more; therefore, we consider only
the ®rst nine rounds of second-stage decisions
for each group.
On the left portion of Figure 3 are depicted
the average decisions of the participants in

the two collections of groups for the eight
rounds before they either were allowed to
communicate or were faced with the regulation. Clearly, the Nash equilibrium (x  6 for
each subject) was not reached, nor did the
ecient solution x  1 obtain. The average
over the eight rounds for the nine groups who
would later communicate was 4.39, and for
the other groups, 4.32. Furthermore, Figure 3
suggests that average choices were relatively
stable throughout the ®rst stage for both
sets of groups. As one would expect with
randomly formed groups and identical experiments, there was no statistical dierence
between the two sets of groups (Table 1, row 1,
column 3).
The second-stage results for the groups that
faced the time quota are quite interesting.
Figure 3 shows that in the ®rst round after the
rule was introduced, average time spent collecting ®rewood plunged to below two. But as
the players became comfortable with the quota
and the weak consequences of exceeding the
quota, and as they understood that others were
also violating the regulation, average choices
rose over the rounds to exceed four units of
time collecting ®rewood. The erosion of the
in¯uence of the regulation is unmistakableÐif
one compares the ®nal three rounds of the ®rst
and second stages, one ®nds no statistical difference in average choices (Table 1, row 3a,
column 3), indicating that by the end of the
second stage the regulation had no eect on
average choices. Furthermore, the average
choice of those facing the regulation for the
®rst three rounds of the second stage was 2.60,
while for the ®nal three rounds it was 4.13, a
statistical and sizable dierence (Table 1, row
4a, column 3).
In contrast, the communication groups were
able to make more ecient choices. The average choice of these subjects shows a statistically
signi®cant decline in months of eort to extract
®rewood from 4.39 for all rounds in the ®rst
stage (in which they could not communicate) to
3.53 after communication was allowed (Table
1, row 2b, column 3), an indication of greater
cooperation. Comparing the ®nal three rounds
before communication with the ®nal three
communication rounds shows a similar reduction (Table 1, row 3b, column 3). Moreover,
unlike the regulation groups, that social improvement was relatively stable from the early
second stage rounds to the last; there is
no statistically signi®cant dierence between
the mean choice for the ®rst three rounds

Figure 3. Average individual decisions.

after communication and for the mean choice
for the ®nal three rounds (Table 1, row 4b,
column 3).

Although the snapshot provided by analyzing average choices is illuminating, it does not
tell us much about how institutions aect the

Table 1. Summary of statistical testsa
Situation

1. COM vs
REG, ®rst
stage
2a. REG

2b. COM

3a. REG
last 3
rounds
3b. COM
last 3
rounds
4a. Sustainability
REG
4b. Sustainability
COM
a

Cases

Average
months

COM (all
rounds)
REG (all
rounds)
First stage (all
rounds)
Second stage
(all rounds)
First stage (all
rounds)
Second stage
(all rounds)
First stage
(last 3 rounds)
Second stage
(last 3 rounds)
First stage
(last 3 rounds)
Second stage
(last 3 rounds)
Second stage
(®rst 3 rounds)
Second stage
(last 3 rounds)
Second stage
(®rst 3 rounds)
Second stage
(last 3 rounds)

4.39

p-value

4.32

0.76

0.00

0.00

0.96

0.00

The p-values are from the Wilcoxon rank sum test.

4.34

1.66

4.37

0.00

1.66

0.00

4.37

0.54

449

0.00

471

0.00

403
0.00

366

0.07

369
0.00

470

0.00

537
0.00

4.07
0.40

377

370

4.96

3.70
3.54

0.42

3.19

2.60
4.13

3.32

p-value

377

3.53

4.40
3.54

0.85

3.19

4.13
4.13

3.20

Average
earnings
($)
370

3.20

4.39
3.53

p-value
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Figure 4. Average deviations from individual Nash best-responses.

balance between self-interested and otherregarding behavior. For this we need to analyze
the average deviation of the decisions of the
participants from their individual Nash strategies in each round. 6 These comparisons are in
Figure 4 and column 4 of Table 1.
The left-hand side of Figure 4 shows that both
sets of groups, those that would later be subjected to a rule and those that would later be
allowed to communicate, made choices in the
®rst stage that were more than three units lower
on average than their Nash best-responses.
Thus, without the ability to communicate and
without outside intervention, the participants
made choices that were, on average, signi®cantly more group-oriented than their Nash
strategies. As expected, there was no statistical
dierence between the communication and
regulation groups, who averaged 3.19 and 3.20,
respectively (Table 1, row 1, column 4).
When the regulation was introduced, several
outcomes are of note. First, the average deviation from best-responses in the second
stage remained statistically unchanged from
the ®rst stage rounds (Table 1, row 2a, column 4). But in comparing the last three
rounds of the ®rst stage with the last three
rounds of the second stage, allowing participants to adjust to the experiment in the ®rst
stage and to the regulation in the second, we
observe a sizable and statistical change in
average deviations from Nash responses. In
the ®rst stage the average for the ®nal three
rounds was 3.53, while during the ®nal three
rounds of the second stage, participants were,
on average, within 1.66 of their Nash re-

sponses (Table 1, row 3a, column 4). Clearly,
as participants gained experience with the time
quota, the imperfect monitoring, and the ®nancial sanctions, they moved rather rapidly
toward their self-interested responses; the average deviation from Nash responses in the
®rst three rounds of the second stage of 4.96
plummeted to 1.66 by the ®nal three rounds
(Table 1, row 4a, column 4).
One of the groups facing the regulation behaved very dierently from the others. Its
members actually made choices that were
much further from their best responses than
they did prior to the imposition of the time
quota. The average deviation from their bestresponses rose from 4.83 in the ®nal three
rounds of the ®rst stage to 6.75 in the ®nal
three rounds under the regulation. Excluding
this unusual group, the average deviation of
the other groups facing the regulation was 0.39
in the ®nal rounds of the second stage. This
value is not statistically dierent from zero,
implying that these subjects were, on average,
essentially playing their Nash best-responses
after they gained some experience under the
regulation.
If one accepts the notion that the dierence
between the Nash response and the actual
choice of an individual is an indication of how
the person balances own interests against those
of the rest of the group, the message is clear.
After the subjects that faced the external regulation quickly adjusted to the relatively modest
consequences of noncompliance, they made
choices that were signi®cantly closer to their
purely self-interested Nash responses. Thus, it

appears that the presence of an external control
crowded out other-regarding behavior in favor
of greater self-interest.
The participants that were allowed to communicate, in contrast, moved further from their
Nash best-responses, making more ecient
choices on average; their mean deviations rose
from 3.19 before communication was allowed
to 4.34 afterward (Table 1, row 2b, column 4).
Comparing, as with the regulation groups,
mean deviations for the ®nal three rounds of
the ®rst and second stages, we ®nd a similar
move toward greater group-regarding decisions. The average deviation from best responses for the ®nal three periods before
communication was allowed was 3.19, compared with 4.37 for the ®nal three rounds after
communication was allowed (Table 1, row 3b,
column 4). Finally, unlike the groups facing the
outside regulation, once communication was
allowed, the average deviation from the Nash
responses was relatively stable: the mean deviation in the ®rst three rounds of communication was 4.07, and for the ®nal three rounds,
4.37 (Table 1, row 4b, column 4).
The dierence between the eects of communication and regulation on the balance between self and other-regarding behavior could
not be more stark. While external regulation
quickly crowded out group-oriented behavior
in favor of greater self-interest, the simple
ability to communicate induced a shift from
choices that were relatively group-oriented in
the absence of communication to an even
stronger group-orientation with communication.

And it should come as no surprise that these
eects are re¯ected in the subjectsÕ earnings.
Figure 5 and column 5 of Table 1 analyze
changes in average earnings. 7 Consistent with
the average eort levels and the average deviations from individual Nash responses, the per
round earnings of participants of the two sets
of groups in the ®rst stage were statistically
identical, $370 and $377 (Table 1, row 1, column 5).
The average per round earnings of those
that faced the regulation in the second stage
rose statistically, from $377 to $449 (Table 1,
row 2a, column 5). Clearly much of this increase is due to behavior in the ®rst several
second-stage rounds in which a high proportion of the participants complied with the
regulation. But, of course, these initial gains
quickly dissipated; comparing the last three
rounds of the ®rst and second stages, we have
a statistical loss in average earnings from $403
per round in the ®rst stage to $366 per round
in the second (Table 1, row 3a, column 5).
Even more dramatically, average earnings fell
from $537 in the ®rst three rounds of the
second stage to $366 in the ®nal three rounds
(Table 1, row 4a, column 5).
Recall that one of the regulation groups
made choices that were signi®cantly more
group-oriented during the second stage than
the others. Looking at the earnings of this
group apart from the rest provides a dramatic
illustration of the welfare consequences of the
crowding out eect of regulation. Average
earnings over the last three rounds of the second stage for this group were $641 per round.

Figure 5. Average individual earnings.

The other regulation groups, who essentially
played Nash strategies over those same rounds,
earned $296. These same subjects earned
an average of $373 per round over the last
three rounds before the regulation was introduced.
In contrast, the communication groups
earned consistently more when allowed to
communicate. Considering all rounds, average
earnings rose from $370 in the ®rst stage to
$471 in the second (Table 1, row 2b, column 5).
Nearly the same gains are observed when considering only the last three rounds of the ®rst
and second stages (Table 1, row 3b, column 5).
The gains aorded the participants that were
allowed to communicate were stable in the
second stage; there was no statistical dierence
in earnings at the beginning of the communications rounds and the ®nal communications
rounds (Table 1, row 4b, column 5). Finally, it
is worth noting that at the end of the second
stage, the communication groups were earning
about 26% more, on average, than the regulation groups combined.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY AND
FUTURE RESEARCH
We have presented evidence that indicates
that local environmental policies that are
modestly enforced, but nevertheless are predicted by standard theory to be welfareimproving, may be ineective. In fact, such a
policy can do more harm than good, especially
in comparison to allowing individuals collectively to confront local environmental dilemmas without intervention. We have also
argued, and presented evidence, that the fundamental reason for the poor performance of
external control is that it crowded out groupregarding behavior in favor of greater selfinterest.
If true in a wide range of environmental and
other social contexts, the implications of our
results are rather substantial. Economic theory will be a poor guide for designing environmental policies if it does not allow for
other-regarding motivations, or if it fails to
recognize that these motivations are not ®xed
with respect to institutional arrangements.
Recognizing institutional endogeneity of the
balance between self-interested and groupregarding behavior when it occurs will have

profound implications for nearly every aspect
of environmental policy design and evaluation,
including:
Ðcost/bene®t analyses to identify ecient
environmental goals;
Ðthe choice of environmental problems that
can be addressed eciently by government
regulation;
Ðthe federalism question of which level of
government (local, state, or federal) should
confront a particular environmental problem;
Ðthe choice of control instrument (quotas,
taxes, transferable property rights); and
Ðthe design of enforcement strategies.
A complete accounting of the possible rami®cations of the crowding-out hypothesis for environmental policy is well beyond the scope of
this paper, but let us discuss a few.
Our results have implications for the performance of well-intentioned but only modestly
enforced environmental polices, which currently exist in rather great numbers. One may
be tempted to believe that inadequate enforcement of these policies, at worst, renders them
ineective, or that they only fall short of their
intended goals. Our results suggest a more
pessimistic possibility: policies intended to
reach more desirable social states, but that are
weakly enforced, may actually do more harm
than good because their existence triggers the
crowding-out of socially desirable behavior.
The remedy is not necessarily more vigorous
enforcement. More stringent enforcement generally is more costly. Furthermore, the crowding-out phenomenon may very well imply that
the potential welfare gains from regulation are
less than standard theory would predict. Thus,
in some cases, the welfare gains may not justify
the costs of achieving acceptable levels of
compliance.
Others have suggested that crowding-out of
other-regarding behavior triggered by a particular regulation may spill over into other
social dilemmas that a community faces (WeckHannemann & Frey, 1995). For example, the
crowding-out of public spiritedness as a consequence of the government restriction on collecting ®rewood from a nearby forest may, in
actual settings, make it more dicult for a
community to deal with other environmental
issues like the disposal of household waste.
Thus, the eects and costs of crowding-out
triggered by a particular regulation may extend
well beyond the problem the regulation is intended to address.

On a more optimistic note, our results suggest that more research should be aimed at
learning how institutions may be designed
which promote cooperation and avoid crowding-out group-regarding motives and behavior.
For example, government regulations are occasionally developed in concert with the eorts
of local grass roots organizations. Active
communication and eort at the local level
might eliminate or reduce the tendency of
government regulations to induce more selfinterested behavior, perhaps because local
participation reminds community members
that they have the power to in¯uence the wellbeing of their community and that ``cheating''
is more than simply a game against the government. If the aliation of a regulation with
local groups helps to avoid a crowding-out of
cooperative spirit, then our results suggest that
such a rule will be more successful than the
regulation alone.
Relatedly, an implication is that the framing
of a regulation may be even more important
than currently appreciated. It now seems clear
that institutions frame choices, and the way
they are framed can have important eects on
choice behavior (Bowles, 1998, p. 87). The
manner in which a regulation is marketed may
well make a dierence in the degree of otherregarding behaviors exhibited by participants
in a game as well as by members of society in
the real world. Additional care in framing rules
in ways more friendly to the objective of stimulating more socially ecient choices may
produce substantial payos if doing so eliminates the tendency of external rules to crowd
out other-regarding behavior.
These policy implications, as well as others
not mentioned, also suggest potentially fruitful
directions for additional research. For example,
additional experiments should hold constant
the type of rule, but vary the way it is framed to

learn more about the eect of framing per se on
crowding out. Further, to investigate whether
local community eorts may or may not ameliorate crowding out associated with externallyimposed regulations, additional experiments
should be undertaken in which one set of
groups is subject to a rule and not allowed to
communicate, while another set is subjected to
the same rule, but where participants are allowed to communicate with each other.
It would be useful, as well, to conduct a
number of experiments in the reverse order.
Since external regulations are rather commonplace in many environmental dilemma settings,
it would be useful to know whether the behavioral responses to an institutional change
are symmetric. If more self-interested behavior
follows a change to government regulation,
would a move away from external regulation
induce more other-regarding behavior? Sunstein's (1993) observation that preferences for a
good or a right depend on whether it was initially an entitlement conferred by an external
body suggests that the behavioral responses to
an institutional change might not be symmetric; that is, behavioral responses may depend
on the order in which institutional change
occurs.
Previous research, and the research reported
here, suggests that typically individuals in a
local environmental dilemma do not make ef®cient choices; neither do they act in a purely
self-regarding way. Regulations developed in
the hopes of resolving environmental and social
dilemmas typically aim at nudging individuals
toward more socially ecient actions. Our results, and the related work of others, suggest
that these good intentions can be thwarted if
external rules trigger a loss of public spiritedness. Policies that do not take account of this
phenomenon may very well do more harm than
good.

NOTES
1. Although Titmus did not oer convincing evidence
of this conjecture, Upton (1973) made a more compelling case. Among a group of previous donors in Denver
and Kansas City, some were oered payments to give
again while others were not. The rate of donating was
substantially higher among those not oered the monetary reward.
2. In this sense, preferences may in some settings be
endogenous, notwithstanding the generations of econo-

mists who have assumed preference exogeneity. Arguing
the plausibility of endogenous preferences, Bowles
(1998, p. 75) asserts, ``Markets and other economic
institutions do more than allocate goods and services;
they also in¯uence the evolution of values, tastes, and
personalities.'' Similarly, in the arena of the environment, Sunstein (1993, pp. 223±224) argues that it may
not be possible for government to assume preferences to
be exogenous, because, `` . . . whether people have a
preference for a good, a right, or anything else is often in

part a function of whether the government, or law, has
allocated it to them in the ®rst instance.''

for example, income tax compliance in the United States
(Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998).

3. Since the playerÕs payos are identical, optimality
requires symmetric individual choices. Let x denote the
common amount of time each individual spends collecting ®rewood in any symmetric outcome. Using [1], the
joint welfare function is W x  n lg =da q0 ÿ b nx2 =2
 cx ÿ / x2 =2  w  e ÿ xg . The ®rst-order condition for the maximization of W(x) requires ÿabxn2 
c ÿ /x ÿ w  0. Solving for x and substituting the actual parameter values yields optimal individual amounts
of time spent harvesting ®rewood, x  c ÿ w=
/  abn2   1.

5. Clearly, we could not control the risk-attitudes of
the subjects. Predominant risk-aversion would imply
lower Nash equilibrium individual choices, while riskloving would have the opposite eect.

4. Even in industrialized countries, enforcement strategies for environmental and natural resource regulations
appear to be rather weak in the sense that expected
marginal penalties do not appear to be sucient to
ensure acceptable levels of compliance (Cohen, 1998).
This also appears to be true of other forms of regulation;

6. For each individual and each round, the highlighted
cells in Figures 1 and 2 give individual Nash bestresponses. The choices of the rest of the group in a
particular round were taken to be their actual choices.
We calculated the dierence between each individualÕs
best response and their actual choice and averaged these
dierences for each round for the communication and
the regulation groups.
7. Earnings data for those groups that faced the
external regulation are net of the penalties that were
assessed.
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